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A STUDY OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND
THE CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT IMPROVEMENT ACT
AS APPLIED TO CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT
WATER SERVICE CONTRACTS
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I.

THE WATER QUALITY REQUIREMENTS
A.

Central Valiev Project Improvement Act of 1992.

"The Secretary [of the Interior], immediately upon enactment
of this title, shall operate the Central valley Project to
meet all obligations under state and federal law, including
but not limited to the federal Endangered Species Act . . .
and all decisions of the California State Water Resources
Control Board establishing conditions on applicable licenses
and permits for the project. The Secretary, in consultation
with other State and Federal agencies, Indian tribes, and
affected interests, is further authorized and directed to:
*

*

*

(2) upon enactment of this title dedicate and manage
800,000 acre-feet of Central Valley Project yield for the
primary purpose of implementing the fish, wildlife, and
habitat restoration purposes and measures authorized by [the
Act]; to assist the State of California in its efforts to
protect the waters of the San Francisco Bay/Sacramento-San
Joaquin Delta Estuary; and to help meet such obligations as
may be legally imposed upon the Central Valley Project under
state or federal law following the date of enactment of this
title, including but not limited to additional obligations
under the federal Endangered Species Act." CVPIA § 3406(b) .
B.

The Endangered Species Ac t .

"[The Bureau of] Reclamation's declaration of available supplies
for water year 1993 is as follows:
CONTRACTORS

*

PERCENT SUPPLY

Agricultural contractors north of the Delta
Agricultural contractors south of the Delta
Urban contractors south of the Delta
Urban contractors south of the Delta
Wildlife refuges north of the Delta
Wildlife refuges south of the Delta
Fish and Wildlife
Sacramento River water rights holders and
San Joaquin River exchange contractors
Percentage of historic use.

100
50
100
75*
100
75
100
100

The forecasted operations meet Endangered Species Act
requirements and the requirements of Public Law 102-575 (the
Central Valley Project Inprovement Act) . Two conditions
influencing the availability of water for CVP contractors are the
cumulative effects of 6 previous years of dry conditions and the
practical and regulatory limits of moving water to CVP facilities
south of the Delta under the current conditions."
Central Valley Project Water Supply for 1993, April 7, 1993.
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II.

THE LAW
A.

The Fifth Amendment.

"No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation."
B.

Madera Irrigation District v. Hancock, 985 F.2d 1397, 1400
(9th Cir. 1993).

"Congress can change federal policy, but it cannot
write on a blank slate. The old policies deposit a moraine
of contracts, conveyances, expectations and investments.
Lives, families, businesses, and towns are built on the
basis of old policies. When Congress changes course, its
flexibility is limited by those interests created under the
old policies which enjoy legal protection. Fairness toward
those who relied on continuation of past policies cuts
toward protection. Flexibility, so that government can
adapt to changing conditions and changing majority
preferences cuts against. Expectations reasonably based
upon constitutionally protected property rights are
protected against policy changes by the Fifth Amendment.
Those based only on economic and political predictions, not
property rights, are not protected."
C.

Horowitz v. United States. 267 U.S. 458, 461 (1925).

"It has long been held . . . that the United States when sued as
a contractor cannot be held liable for an obstruction to the
performance of the particular contract resulting from its public
and general acts as a sovereign."
III. THE CASES
A.

Westlands Water District v. United States. No. CV-F-93-5327
OWW (U.S. Dist. Ct., E.D. Calif.).
1.

50% reduction in water service to agricultural
contractors south of the Delta, based on the Bureau of
Reclamation's compliance with ESA and the CVPIA. This
reduction occurred during a 150% of normal water year.

2.

Fish, Wildlife & Habitat Restoration Fund Surcharge of
$6 per acre foot for irrigation water and $12 per acre
foot for M&I water. See CVPIA § 3407(d) (2) .

3.

Alleged contract rights to water service of a fixed
quantity and at a fixed price:
a.

Westlands Contract:

Article 3 (f): "The right to the beneficial use of
water furnished to the District pursuant to the terms
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of this contract and any renewal hereof shall not be
disturbed so long as the District shall fulfill all of
its obligations under this contract and any such
renewal."
Article 11 (a): "There may occur at times during any
year a shortage in the quantity of water available for
furnishing to the District through and by means of the
Project, but in no event shall any liability accrue
against the United States or any of its officers,
agents, or employees for any damage, direct or
indirect, arising from a shortage on account of errors
in operation, drought, or any other causes. . . . "
Article 26: "In the event that the Congress of the
United States repeals the so-called excess-land
provisions of the Federal reclamation laws, Articles
23, 24, and 25 of this contract will no longer be of
any force or effect, and, in the event that Congress
amends the excess-land provisions or other provisions
of the Federal reclamation laws, the United States
agrees, at the option of the District, to negotiate
amendments of appropriate articles of this contract,
all consistently with the provisions of such repeal or
amendment."

b.

Shortage Provisions of the Other..San Luis
Unit Contracts:

"In its operation of the Project, the United States
will use all reasonable means to guard against a
condition of shortage in the quantity of water
available to the
Contractorpursuant t
Nevertheless, if a shortage does occur during any year
on account of drought, or other causes which, in the
opinion of the Contracting Officer are beyond the
control of the United States, no liability shall
accrue against the United States or any of its
officers, agents, or employees for any damage, direct
or indirect, arising therefrom . . . ."
4.

Remaining terms of the contracts are between 9 and 15
years.

5.

The San Luis Unit contractors--the Westlands, San
Benito, San Luis, and Panoche Water Districts--have
claimed that the United States has breached their
water service contracts in violation of the Fifth
Amendment by operating the CVP to conply with ESA and
the CVPIA.

6.

On February 10, 1994, Judge Oliver W. Wanger granted
motions to dismiss Westlands' due process and takings
claims, but denied motions to dismiss the Fifth
Amendment claims of the other San Luis Unit plaintiffs.
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B.

Peterson v. Department of the Interior, 899 F.2d 799 (9th
Cir. 1990).
1.

Challenge to constitutionality of the "Hammer Clause"
of the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982. 43 U.S.C. §
390cc(b).

2.

The Reclamation Act of 1902.

3.

a.

Jeffersonian ideal of agrarian economy.

b.

Small, family farms--160 acre limitation.

c.

Subsidized water.

Leased lands loophole:
"By 1981, only 23% of the land receiving federal
reclamation project water was farmed in operations of
160 acres or less. Three percent of the farming
operations receiving reclamation benefits controlled
30% of all of the irrigated lands in the program. The
largest farms, which comprised 20% of the irrigated
acreage in the program, averaged 3,721 irrigable
acres. The greatest individual beneficiaries of the
practice of unlimited leasing were large corporate
farming operations located in California's San Joaquin
Valley." Peterson, 899 F.2d at 805.
"The federal subsidy to these large farming operations
was enormous. The contract price of water delivered
to the Water Districts ranged from $2.00 to $7.50 per
acre foot. In contrast, the actual cost to the United
States of providing this water was between $8.43 and
$55.61. The value of the water subsidy provided to
Southern Pacific Land Company alone was estimated at
$6 million per year." Id.
"By 1982, the Congressional Budget Office calculated
that the United States would in the next five years
spend roughly $3.8 billion on Bureau of Reclamation
water projects, but would recoup only $275 million as
a result of existing reclamation repayment policies."
Id. at 804.

4.

The Reclamation Reform Act of 1982.
a.

960 acre limitation for subsidized water.

b. Landholdings in excess of the new acreage
limitation must pay full cost for project water.
c. Closure of leasing loophole: The RRA defines
landholding as the "total irrigable acreage of one or
more tracts of land . . . owned or operated under a
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lease."
5.

43 U.S.C. § 390bb(6).

The Hammer Clause, 43 U.S.C. § 390cc(b) :
Contractors and recipients of project water must elect
to amend their existing contracts to conform to the
new acreage limitations and pricing provisions
- or effective April 12, 1987, they must pay "full cost"
for all water supplied to landholdings of any kind in
excess of 160 acres.

6.

CVP contractors claimed that the Hammer Clause
breached their contracts and therefore violated the
due process and takings clauses of the Fifth
Amendment.

7.

The Court of Appeals held that the contractors did not
have explicit contract rights to subsidized water for
leased lands in excess of the 160 acre limitation.

8.

The contracts provided, however, that no project water
would be delivered to excess lands, which were defined
as land "in excess of 160 acres held in beneficial
ownership of any private individual."
Did the term "beneficial ownership" mean only fee
title or all types of ownership of real property,
including leasing arrangements? The United States,
acting through the Bureau of Reclamation, had
interpreted the term "beneficial ownership" to mean
only fee interests. This interpretation would support
the contractors' claims that they had a right to
subsidized project water for leased lands m excess of
the 160 acre limitation on land owned in fee.

9.

Nevertheless, the Court ruled against the plaintiffs'
impairment of contract and Fifth Amendment claims.

10.

Interpretational Principles:
"The first step in both due process and taking
analysis is to determine whether there is a property
right that is protected by the Constitution. * * *
"There is no question that the federal
government, 'as sovereign, has the power to enter
contracts that confer vested rights, and the
concomitant duty to honor those rights.'"
Nonetheless, when interpreting the federal
government's contractual agreements, we are guided by
three paramount principles:
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First, "'sovereign power, even when unexercised,
is an enduring presence that governs all
contracts subject to the sovereign's
jurisdiction, and will remain intact unless
surrendered in unmistakable terms.'" Thus,
"contractual arrangements, including those to
which a sovereign itself is party, 'remain
subject to subsequent legislation' by the
sovereign."
Second, governmental contracts "should be
construed, if possible, to avoid foreclosing
exercise of sovereign authority."
Third, governmental contracts should be
interpreted against the backdrop of the
legislative scheme that authorized them, and our
interpretation of ambiguous terms or implied
covenants can only be made in light of the
policies underlying the controlling legislation."
Peterson, 899 F.2d at 807 (quoting Bowen
Public
Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment, All
U.S. 41, 52 (1986)).
11.

The Court also rejected the plaintiffs' claim that a
contract term that is commonly used in the CVP
contracts waives Congress' sovereign power to change
the law and to apply the new law to existing CVP
contracts.
"In our view, the clause granting the Districts
the option of renegotiating their contracts cannot
reasonably be interpreted as a 'surrender [] in
unmistakable terms' of the sovereign's power to make
changes in the federal reclamation laws. Such an
interpretation would do violence to the principle that
government contracts should be construed, whenever
possible, 'to avoid foreclosing exercise of sovereign
authority. ' In light of this principle, we believe
that a more reasonable interpretation of Article 21 is
that it grants the Water Districts the option of
renegotiating the terms of their contracts to conform
to Congress's amendments to the excess land provisions
of the reclamation law. This option does not,
however, give the Water Districts the right to
continue to receive reclamation water under the terms
of the pre-existing contracts if those terms violate
the newly amended law." Id. at 812.
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c.

Madera Irrigation District v. Hancock. 985 F.2d 1397 (9th
Cir. 1993)
1.

1986 Amendment to the Federal Reclamation Laws, Pub.
L. No. 99-546, § 106, 100 Stat. 5050, 5052 (1986).
In all renewal contracts, CVP contractors must repay
to the United States any accumulated deficit of O&M
expenses not paid under their existing contracts.

2.

The O&M deficit was caused by the use of long-term,
fixed rate contracts and drastically increased O&M
costs from the mid-1960's to present.
By 1986, the system-wide O&M deficit for the CVP was
$38 million.

3.

Madera has a permanent contract right to water service
at rates that "shall not exceed charges to others than
the District for the same class of water and service"
within the Friant Unit of the CVP.

4.

Madera claimed that the 1986 statute breached this
contract right, because rates under Madera's renewed
contract would include repayment of its accumulated
O&M deficit and therefore would be higher than other
Friant Unit contractors' rates, some of which have no
O&M deficit. Madera alleged that this breach of
contract violated both the due process and takings
clauses of the Fifth Amendment.

5.

The Court of Appeals rejected Madera's Fifth Amendment
claims, concluding that Madera's contract rights were
not sufficiently clear and categorical:
"Congress decided in the plainest terms to change
its policy, so that instead of buying subsidized
water, purchasers of the new water will have to pay
its full operation and maintenance costs, plus an
increment measured by the subsidy furnished to
purchasers of the old water. We are unable to say
that by the words, 'shall not exceed charges made to
others than the District for the same class of water
and service, ' the government's sovereign authority to
charge more for water service with a higher operation
and maintenance cost was 'surrendered in unmistakable
terms.'" Madera, 985 F.2d at 1404.
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IV.

EVALUATION OF THE PRESERVED SOVEREIGN POWER DOCTRINE
A.

B.

The Power to Tax.
1.

CVPIA § 3407(d)(2)--The Restoration Fund Surcharge.

2.

Merrion
(1982) .

v.Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 45

a.

Long-term coal leases at fixed royalty payments
to the Tribe.

b.

According to the contracts, "No change may be
made in the rate of royalty or annual rental
without written consent of the parties."

c.

The Tribe subsequently enacted a severance tax.

d.

The coal conpanies claimed that the tax violated
their contract rights to fixed royalty payments
and therefore was illegal.

e.

The Supreme Court unanimously rejected the coal
companies' breach of contract claim. The Court
applied the retained sovereignty principle and
concluded that

Other Substantive Statutory Changes.
1.

ESA and CVPIA § 3406 (b)--"The Regulatory Water
Shortage."

2.

Separation of Powers.
a.

Madera Irrigation District v.
985 F.2d
at 1407 (Hall, J., concurring):
"It is doubtful
that the Secretary of the Interior could, by
contract, waive the right of Congress to pass
laws . . . ."

b.

Transohio Savings Bank v. Director, Office of
Thrift Supervision, 967 F.2d 598, 621 (D.C. Cir.
1992):
" [W]e assume without expressing a view that
Congress might delegate to an agency the power to
contract away Congress' regulatory power--though
the Supreme Court has never considered such a
congressional delegation.
"Even if such a delegation is permissible,
however, Congress cannot be found to have
delegated to an agency the power to preclude
subsequent regulatory legislation unless the
delegation was explicit. In the context of
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contracts entered into by administrative
agencies, in other words, the [retained
sovereignty] doctrine has two components: the
contract relinquishes Congress' power to regulate
only when (1) the agency, in the contract has
unmistakably waived Congress' regulatory
authority, and (2) Congress, in a statute, has
unmistakably delegated to the agency the power to
surrender Congress' regulatory authority."
3.

4.

C.

Frustration of Congressional Purposes.
a.

The contention that new laws may not be applied
to existing contracts is a substantive due
process claim. See Western Fuels-Utah, Inc. v.
Lujan, 895 F.2d 780, 789-90 (D.C. Cir. 1990).

b.

Rejection of the retained sovereignty doctrine
"would allow federal agencies to supplant
congressional policymaking by contracting away
Congress' power to regulate. . . . [A]gencies
would be making laws not pursuant to
congressional direction, but over Congress'
objections. The framers, however, 'fully
recognized that nothing would so jeopardize the
legitimacy of a system of government that relies
upon the ebbs and flows of politics to "clean out
the rascals" than the possibility that those same
rascals might perpetuate their policies simply by
locking them into binding contracts.'"
Transohio, 967 F.2d at 622 (quoting United States
Trust Co, v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 45 (1977)
(Brennan, J., dissenting)) .

Public Resources and Public Rights.
a.

Forced subsidies at amounts greater than the
public's representatives have authorized.

b.

Forced water deliveries at costs that the public
has chosen not to bear--water pollution, _
declining fisheries, loss of wetlands and
riparian habitat.

c.

Forced transfers of public resources to private
use that the public no longer supports.

Two Criticisms.
1.

The "public" resources have been effectively converted
to private resources by the contracts in question.
By applying new laws to existing contract rights, the
United States has violated the proscription
articulated by the Supreme Court in Lucas v. South
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Carolina Coastal Council, 112 U.S. 2886 (1992), that
" [t]he state by ipse dixit may not transform private
property into public property without compensation."
2.

D.

As the Court of Appeals stated in Madera, 985 F.2d at
1401: "Too liberal an interpretation of the residual
sovereign power of the government to override its
contractual commitments would eviscerate the
government's power to bind itself to contracts."

Responses.
1.

These cases stand primarily for the proposition that
the courts should scrutinize carefully the contract
right asserted as a bar to the application of the
amended law. The Fifth Amendment only protects
"property," which is defined formally by the precise
terms of the contracts and applicable law. It does
not protect expectations or inferences that are not
based on the express and unequivocal terms of the
contracts.
This is consistent with the holding in Lucas that
restrictions that "inhere in the title itself" may be
enforced even if the result is the complete
elimination of the value or benefits associated with
the contract or real property in question. See 112
U.S. at 2900.

2.

If the contract has created property rights
enforceable under the Fifth Amendment, a distinction
must be drawn between
prospectivean
application.
As the Supreme Court observed in Public Agencies, 477
U.S. at 51: "Congress' exercise of the reserved power
has a limit in that Congress could not rely on that
power to take away . . . the fruits [of the contract]
already reduced to possession."
Prospectively, the "private rights" retain their
public character insofar as the public is not
constitutionally required to honor contractual
requirements for future transfers of resources to
private ownership that would conflict with the new
law.

3.

The concern that the retained sovereignty doctrine
will impair the ability of the United States to enter
into contracts ignores several important facts.
a.

Many contracts and other licensed activities in
the natural resources area embody federal
subsidies--e.g., water service contracts, timber
sales agreements, mineral leases, and grazing permits
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As the Supreme Court stated in
Irrigation
District v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 296 (1958)
(quoting Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. Ill, 131
(1942)), '"It is hardly lack of due process for
the Government to regulate that which it
subsidizes.'"

V.

b.

The parties to more traditional government
contracts--those that are the products of arm's
length negotiations— can take the risk of changes
in the governing law into account in bargaining
over the terms of the contracts.

c.

Ultimately, this concern is more properly
addressed to the Congress and the Executive.

CONCLUSION

The retained sovereignty doctrine may- be controversial, or even
counterintuitive. It represents, however, a salutary means of
ensuring that what Charles Wilkinson has called the "Lords of
Yesteryear"— the predominantly developmental and exploitative resource
policies of the General Mining Law, the Forest Service Organic Act,
the Reclamation Act, and other laws— do not frustrate m o d e m efforts
to accommodate resource develop with contemporary values, embodied in
contemporary laws, supported by contemporary scientific understanding.
VI.

RELATED CASES OF INTEREST

Everett Plywood Corp. v. United States, 651 F.2d 723 (Ct. Cl. 1981)
(timber sales contract— retained sovereignty doctrine not applied) .
Western Fuels-Utah, Inc. v. Lujan, 895 F.2d 780, 789-90 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (coal leases— retained sovereignty doctrine applied) .
f

Swanson v. Babbitt, 3 F.3d 1348 (9th Cir. 1993) (mining patent
application--retained sovereignty doctrine not needed).
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